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Since 2010, Canada has moved to implement three elements of migration policy that 
have existed in Australia for some time. Canada has proposed the introduction of 
provisional partner visas, which will require the holder of a spouse visa to remain 
in the relationship for two years in Canada before permanent residence can be 
granted (subject to exceptions for family violence and other matters beyond the 
control of the applicant). Canada’s regulation of the immigration advice profession 
mirrors Australia’s regulatory system closely. Finally, and most controversially, Bill 
C-4 of 2011 will, if enacted, bring in a form of mandatory immigration detention 
that closely follows Australia’s first mandatory immigration detention laws, which 
were enacted in 1992. This paper compares Bill C-4 with the Australian Migration 
Amendment Act 1992, and demonstrates the considerable resemblance between 
them. I will then discuss the likely future of the Canadian legislation, which I will 
argue is likely to be significantly different to the fate of the Australian legislation, 
which was found to be constitutionally valid by the High Court of Australia in Lim 
v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, although contrary 
to Australia’s international obligations in the UN Human Rights Committee opinion 
in A v Australia. Bill C-4, on the other hand, would be very likely to be found to 
be in breach of the Charter, especially given the precedent of Charkaoui v Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration). Finally, I ask whether Canada, in a practical sense, 
even needs Bill C-4, given the fact that only two boats of unauthorised arrivals have 
reached Canada since the election of the current government in 2006. 
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Since 2010, Canada has moved to implement three elements of migration policy that 
have existed in Australia for some time. Canada has proposed the introduction of 
provisional partner visas, which will require the holder of a spouse visa to remain in 
the relationship for two years in Canada before permanent residence can be granted 
(subject to exceptions for family violence and other matters beyond the control 
of the applicant)1. Canada’s regulation of the immigration advice profession now 
mirrors Australia’s regulatory system closely2. Finally, and most controversially, 
Bill C-4 of 2011 will, if enacted, bring in a form of mandatory immigration detention 
that closely follows Australia’s first mandatory immigration detention laws, which 
were enacted in 1992, although not the current laws that provide for mandatory 
detention of all unlawful non-citizens in that country.
This paper compares Bill C-4 with the Australian Migration Amendment Act 1992, 
and demonstrates the considerable resemblance between them. I will then move on 
to discuss developments in Australian immigration detention legislation since 1992, 
and offer some suggestions as to why Canada has chosen to draft a Bill based on the 
older Australian legislation, and not the current laws.
I will then discuss the likely future of the Canadian legislation, which I will 
argue is likely to be significantly different to the fate of the Australian legislation, 
which was found to be constitutionally valid by the High Court of Australia in Lim 
v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs3, although contrary to 
Australia’s international obligations in the UN Human Rights Committee opinion 
in A v. Australia4. Bill C-4, on the other hand, would be very likely to be found to 
be in breach of the Charter, especially given the precedent of Charkaoui v. Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration)5. Finally, I ask whether Canada, in a practical sense, 
even needs Bill C-4, given the fact that only two boats of unauthorised arrivals have 
reached Canada since the election of the current government in 2006. 
The terms “illegal arrival” and “unauthorised arrival” are of course themselves 
loaded terms. This article will not discuss whether there is a “right to asylum” or a 
“right to seek asylum” in international law. Article 14 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights states that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other 
countries asylum from persecution”, and this could form the basis of an argument 
that asylum-seekers have a right at international law to take the actions they do. 
Compare this, however, to (for example) s.29 of the Migration Act 1958, which 
requires that all non-citizens entering Australia hold a valid visa, meaning that entry 
1 Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2012-227 October 25, 2012, 
P.C. 2012-1390 October 25, 2012. These regulations insert Regulations 72.1 – 72.4 into the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Regulations SOR/2002-227.
2 The central piece of legislation is s.91 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (SC 2001, c 27), as 
amended by SC 2011 c 8.
3 (1992) 176 CLR 1.
4 Case No 560/1993, Views adopted on 3 April 1997, UN Doc. A/52/40, Vol. II, Annex VI Sec. L.
5 [2007] 1 SCR 350.
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6 [1991] FCA 68.
7 Janet PhilliPs & harriet sPinks, Boat arrivals in australia since 1976, updated 29 January 2013, at 22.
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/
pubs/BN/2012-2013/BoatArrivals
8 Mary Crock, Climbing Jacob’s Ladder: The High Court and the Administrative Detention of Asylum Seekers in 
Australia, (1993) 15 SYD L.R. 338 at 340.
9 [1993] FCA 545.
to Australia by a non-citizen who does not hold a visa is contrary to Australian 
domestic law. Regardless of the arguments, I will use the term “unauthorised 
arrival” in this article because the meaning is well-understood in general discourse.
AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATION – THE MIGRATION AMENDMENT 
ACT 1992
Background
Prior to 1992, Australia detained persons unlawfully present in Australia on a basis 
of individual assessment. In other words, such persons were detained if they had 
serious criminal records or were perceived as a flight risk. Few cases challenging a 
decision to detain an unlawful non-citizen reached the courts, but the Federal Court 
in Msilanga v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs6 found 
that the applicant, who had been served with a deportation order after serving a 
term of imprisonment for infliction of grievous bodily harm, was neither a flight 
risk or a danger to the public, and ordered his release subject to conditions. 
The Migration Amendment Act 1992, which inserted a new Division 4B into Part 2 
of the Migration Act 1958, was the first exercise of mandatory immigration detention 
in Australia. The provisions of this Act will be discussed shortly. The trigger for 
the legislation was undoubtedly a “wave” of boats carrying unauthorised arrivals 
to Australia, which began in 1989. There were no unauthorised maritime arrivals 
to Australia between 1982 and 1988, 26 in 1989, 198 in 1990, 214 in 1991 and 216 in 
19927. Most of these arrivals were from Cambodia, which was then still in the throes 
of a civil war. More particularly, the legislation was introduced into the House two 
days before the Federal Court was due to hear an application from a number of 
Cambodian boat arrivals for their release from detention8.
There was clearly a view within the government at the time that the Cambodian 
boat arrivals were not refugees. A later case, Mok v. Minister for Immigration, Local 
Government and Ethnic Affairs9, considered an argument of apprehended bias on the 
part of the Minister, and institutional bias within the Department of Immigration 
against Cambodian applicants for refugee status. At paragraph 17 of his judgement, 
Keely J reproduced the following extract from a TV interview conducted by the 
Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, on 6 June 1990.
Wendt: We woke up this morning to read that we’re asking the Cambodian Government to take 
back some of the Cambodian boat people who came to our shores. Why are we doing that?
PM: For the obvious reason. I mean, we have - - a compassionate humanitarian policy which will 
stand comparison with any other country in the world. But we’re not here with an open door 
policy saying anyone who wants to come to Australia can come. These people are not political 
refugees. 
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Wendt: How can you be sure of that, Mr Hawke? 
PM: Simply there is not a regime now in Cambodia which is exercising terror, political terror, 
upon its population. 
Wendt: What do you make then of these hundreds of people –  
PM: What we make – 
Wendt: Who get on their tin boats and travel across - - - 
PM: What we make of it is that there is obviously a combination of economic refugeeism, if 
you like. People saying they don’t like a particular regime or they don’t like their economic 
circumstances, therefore they’re going to up, pull up stumps, get in a boat and lob in Australia. 
Well that’s not on. 
Wendt: And risk their lives to do it? 
PM: Their lives is not, I mean, we have an orderly migration program. We’re not going to allow 
people just to jump that queue by saying we’ll jump into a boat, here we are, bugger the people 
who’ve been around the world. We have a ratio of more than 10 to 1 of people who want to come 
to this country compared to the numbers that we take in. 
Wendt: And you personally have no qualms about that? 
PM: Not only no qualms about it, but I will be forceful in ensuring that that is what’s followed.
Migration Amendment Act 1992
The Migration Amendment Act 1992 inserted Division 4B into Part 2 of the Migration 
Act 1958. Firstly, s.54K defined the term “designated person” as follows:
“designated person” means a non-citizen who: 
(a)  has been on a boat in the territorial sea of Australia after 19 November 1989 and before 1 
           December 1992; and 
(b)  has not presented a visa; and 
(c)  is in Australia; and 
(d)  has not been granted an entry permit; and 
(e)  is a person to whom the Department has given a designation by: 
           (i)  determining and recording which boat he or she was on; and 
           (ii)  giving him or her an identifier that is not the same as an identifier given to 
                             another non-citizen who was on that boat; 
and includes a non-citizen born in Australia whose mother is a designated person.
Section 54L then provided that a designated person must be “kept in custody” 
until either removed from Australia or granted an entry permit. Section 54N 
permitted an officer to detain a designated person not already in detention, without 
a warrant, and re-capture any escapee. Removal of designated persons from 
Australia was dealt with by s.54P, which provided for removal on written request of 
the person, when no application for an entry permit was made within two months 
of being detained, or when an application for an entry permit had been refused and 
all avenues of review had been exhausted.
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The most confusing section was s.54Q, which purported to provide that a 
designated person could be detained for a maximum of 273 days (nine months). 
However, the 273-day “clock” could be “stopped” in the circumstances described in 
ss.54Q(3)(c) – (f), which provided as follows:
(c)  the Department is waiting for information relating to the application to be given by a 
           person who is not under the control of the Department; 
(d)  the dealing with the application is at a stage whose duration is under the control of the 
           person or of an adviser or representative of the person; 
(e)  court or tribunal proceedings relating to the application have been begun and not finalised; 
(f)  continued dealing with the application is otherwise beyond the control of the Department.
In other words, the 273-day period only ran when the applicant had provided 
all relevant information to the Department. Paragraphs (d) and (f) in particular 
were very vaguely worded, and indeed could mean nearly anything. It was 
extraordinarily difficult, therefore, to determine whether a particular detainee’s 273-
day period of detention had expired or not.
Finally, the most controversial provision of Division 4B was s.54R, which 
provided that “a court is not to order the release from custody of a designated 
person”. This was ultimately the only provision of Division 4B found to be 
unconstitutional.
Lim v Minister for Immigration
The constitutional validity of Division 4B of the Migration Act was upheld by 
the High Court in Lim10. In that case, the applicant argued that the division was 
unconstitutional on a number of grounds, including that orders for detention were 
inherently punitive in nature, and therefore amounted to an exercise of the judicial 
power of the Commonwealth by the legislature and/or the executive. The High 
Court found that ss.54L and 54N were valid, as they were powers exercised in 
accordance with s.51(xix) of the Constitution11, and were not an exercise of judicial 
power. They could therefore be exercised by administrative decision-makers.
The leading judgement was given by Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ. At 
paragraph 27 of their judgement, their Honours quoted from a Canadian case that 
proceeded on appeal to the Privy Council, Attorney-General for Canada v. Cain, in 
which Lord Atkinson stated as follows12:
One of the rights possessed by the supreme power in every State is the right to refuse to permit 
an alien to enter that State, to annex what conditions it pleases to the permission to enter it, and 
to expel or deport from the State, at pleasure, even a friendly alien, especially if it considers 
his presence in the State opposed to its peace, order, and good government, or to its social or 
material interests.
Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ explained this decision as follows13:
10 Lim, supra note 3.
11 Paragraph 51(xix) permits the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with respect to “naturalisation 
and aliens”.
12 [1906] AC 542 at 546.
13 Lim, supra note 3 at paragraph 28 of the judgement of Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ.
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The question for decision in Attorney-General for Canada v. Cain was whether the Canadian 
statute 60 and 61 Vict c11 had validly clothed the Dominion Government with the power to 
expel an alien and to confine him in custody for the purpose of delivering him to the country 
whence he had entered the Dominion. The Judicial Committee concluded that it had. As the 
emphasised words in the above passage indicate, the power to expel or deport a particular alien, 
and the associated power to confine under restraint to the extent necessary to make expulsion or 
deportation effective, were seen as prima facie executive in character.
At paragraph 29 their Honours noted that previous Australian cases, dating 
back to Koon Wing Lau v. Calwell14 in 1949, had upheld the Constitutional validity 
of legislation providing for discretionary immigration detention, and that s.51(xix) 
permitted the Parliament to make laws that “extend to authorising the Executive 
to restrain an alien in custody to the extent necessary to make the deportation 
effective” – in other words, to ensure that the non-citizen cannot evade removal 
from Australia. Probably the key part of the judgement is set out in paragraph 30:
It can therefore be said that the legislative power conferred by s.51(xix) of the 
Constitution encompasses the conferral upon the Executive of authority to detain 
(or to direct the detention of) an alien in custody for the purposes of expulsion or 
deportation. Such authority to detain an alien in custody, when conferred upon the 
Executive in the context and for the purposes of an executive power of deportation 
or expulsion, constitutes an incident of that executive power. By analogy, authority 
to detain an alien in custody, when conferred in the context and for the purposes of 
executive powers to receive, investigate and determine an application by that alien 
for an entry permit and (after determination) to admit or deport, constitutes an 
incident of those executive powers.
Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ also regarded the fact that the detainee could 
bring their detention to an end by requesting their own removal as important. Their 
Honours stated at paragraph 34 of their judgement as follows:
Section 54P(1) … provides that an officer must remove a designated person from Australia 
as soon as practicable if the designated person asks the Minister, in writing, to be removed. 
It follows that, under Div.4B, it always lies within the power of a designated person to bring 
his or her detention in custody to an end by requesting to be removed from Australia. Once 
such a request has been made, further detention in custody is authorized by Div.4B only for 
the limited period involved, in the circumstances of a particular case, in complying with the 
statutory requirement of removal “as soon as practicable” … In the context of that power of 
a designated person to bring his or her detention in custody under Div.4B to an end at any 
time, the time limitations imposed by other provisions of the Division suffice, in our view, to 
preclude a conclusion that the powers of detention which are conferred upon the Executive 
exceed what is reasonably capable of being seen as necessary for the purposes of deportation or 
for the making and consideration of an entry application. It follows that the powers of detention 
in custody conferred by ss.54L and 54N are an incident of the executive powers of exclusion, 
admission and deportation of aliens and are not, of their nature, part of the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth.
The result of this reasoning was that ss.54L and 54N of the Act were found to 
be valid. Section 54R, on the other hand, was struck down by Brennan, Deane and 
Dawson JJ because it could prevent a court from releasing a designated person who, 
by the terms of the Act itself, should have been released. Their Honours stated as 
follows at paragraph 37:
14 (1949) 80 CLR 533.
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In fact, of course, it is manifest that circumstances could exist in which a “designated person” was 
unlawfully held in custody by a person purportedly acting in pursuance of Div.4B. The reason 
why that is so is that the status of a person as a “designated person” does not automatically cease 
when detention in custody is no longer authorized by Div.4B.
Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ cited as examples of unlawful detention of 
designated persons situations where a designated person remained in detention 
despite making a written request to be removed from Australia, the 273-day limit 
had expired, or the person had not made an application for an entry permit within 
two months of the commencement of their detention. Their Honours summed up by 
stating that “[o]nce it appears that a designated person may be unlawfully held in 
custody in purported pursuance of Div.4B, it necessarily follows that the provision 
of s.54R is invalid”15.
The High Court unanimously upheld the constitutional validity ss.54L and 54N 
of the Migration Act. Gaudron J agreed that s.54R was invalid16, and her Honour 
would have read ss.54L and 54N somewhat more narrowly than the other judges17, 
but her reasoning did not prevent the application of these sections to the applicants. 
Mason CJ, and Toohey and McHugh JJ, who each wrote separate judgements, 
upheld the validity of s.54R by reading it down to cover only those designated 
persons who were being lawfully detained under Division 4B18.
As a concluding point, Division 4B, as were many other provisions of the 
Migration Act, was renumbered by the Migration Reform Act 1992, which came 
into effect on 1 September 1994, and is now Division 6 of Part 2 of the Act. This is 
despite the fact that since the introduction of s.189 of the Act, which provides for 
mandatory detention of all unlawful non-citizens, with effect from the same date, 
Division 6 of Part 2 is redundant and has never been used since that date. Even 
more strangely, s.54R, now renumbered as s.183, remains in the Act despite it being 
found to be invalid.
A v. Australia
It should be noted that the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) 
has found that the then Division 4B of the Act contravened Articles 9(1) and 9(4) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in A v. Australia19. 
These articles of the ICCPR provide as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedure as are established by law. 
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness 
of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.
15 Lim, supra note 3, at paragraph 37 of the judgement of Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ.
16 Ibid at paragraph 18 of the judgement of Gaudron J.
17 Ibid at paragraphs 15-17.
18 Ibid at paragraph 12 of the judgement of Mason CJ; paragraph 34 of the judgement of Toohey J; 
paragraph 35 of the judgement of McHugh J. 
19 A v. Australia, supra note 4. 
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Australia’s argument was basically that “arbitrary” means “unlawful”, and 
therefore A’s detention could not have been unlawful, because only s.54R of the 
Act was found to be unconstitutional20. The UNHRC found that “there is no basis 
for the author’s claim that it is per se arbitrary to detain individuals requesting 
asylum”21, but then found as follows22:
The Committee observes however, that every decision to keep a person in detention should 
be open to review periodically so that the grounds justifying the detention can be assessed. In 
any event, detention should not continue beyond the period for which the State can provide 
appropriate justification.
In other words, the UNHRC took the view that unless a decision was made to 
detain an unlawful non-citizen on an individual basis, that detention was arbitrary 
and contrary to Article 9(1) of the ICCPR. It followed more or less inevitably that 
A was also detained in breach of Article 9(4), because the courts had no power 
to release a person, despite the striking down of s.54R of the Act, other than in 
accordance with the formal requirements of the Act. There was certainly no power 
given to the courts to release a person because their detention was contrary to the 
requirements of Article 9(1). The UNHRC stated as follows23:
In effect, however, the courts’ control and power to order the release of an individual was limited 
to an assessment of whether this individual was a “designated person” within the meaning of 
the Migration Amendment Act. If the criteria for such determination were met, the courts had no 
power to review the continued detention of an individual and to order his / her release. In the 
Committee’s opinion, court review of the lawfulness of detention under article 9, paragraph 4, 
which must include the possibility of ordering release, is not limited to mere compliance of the 
detention with domestic law.
It should be noted that s.9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“the 
Charter”) provides that “[e]veryone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained 
or imprisoned”. The issue of the interpretation of s.9, as compared to Article 9 of 
ICCPR, will be examined later in this paper.
D E V E L O P M E N T S  I N  A U S T R A L I A N  I M M I G R A T I O N 
DETENTION LAW, 1994 TO PRESENT
Immigration Detention Generally
The consideration of the changes in Australian immigration detention law can form 
the basis of a paper in and of itself, and the discussion here will, by necessity, be 
brief. However, the former Division 4B of the Act (now renumbered as Division 
6 of Part 2), has not been used since 1 September 1994. On that date, the Migration 
Reform Act 1992 came into effect, and made a number of significant changes to the 
Migration Act. In the context of this paper, the most important amendment was 
the insertion of s.189, which provided for mandatory immigration detention of all 
20 Ibid at paragraphs 8.1 – 8.11.
21 Ibid at paragraph 9.3.
22 Ibid at paragraph 9.4.
23 Ibid at paragraph 9.5.
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“unlawful non-citizens” present in Australia. Section 13 of the Migration Act defines 
a “lawful non-citizen” as a non-citizen present in the “migration zone”24 who holds 
a visa that is in effect. Subsection 14(1) then describes an unlawful non-citizen as a 
non-citizen in the migration zone, other than a lawful non-citizen. 
Subsection 189(1) then provides that an officer who “knows or reasonably 
suspects” that a person in the migration zone is an unlawful non-citizen must 
detain that person. The term “immigration detention” is itself defined in s.5(1) of 
the Act, and includes a number of forms of detention other than the well-publicised 
Immigration Detention Centres (IDCs). The definition of immigration detention 
was further widened with the passage of the Migration Amendment (Detention 
Arrangements) Act 2005, which inserted Subdivision B, Division 7, Part 2 into the 
Act. Subdivision 7 provides for the making of “residence determinations”, which 
despite being defined as a form of detention in the legislation25 are really a form of 
conditional release from detention.
Under s.196 of the Act, an unlawful non-citizen must be detained until he or 
she is removed from Australia, deported or granted a visa. If a detainee requests 
removal from Australia, he or she must be removed “as soon as reasonably 
practicable” – s.198(1) of the Act. A detainee must also be removed if he or she fails 
to make a valid visa application within a certain period of time, or he or she has 
exhausted all avenues of merits review of a refusal or cancellation decision26.
Bridging Visas
The statement that all unlawful non-citizens in Australia are detained is literally 
true, but may be misleading. It is misleading because visa overstayers (ie those 
people who enter Australia with a valid visa but who remain in Australia after its 
expiration) have much greater access to Bridging Visas (BVs) than unauthorised 
arrivals. A BV, in short, is a visa that keeps a non-citizen lawful while his or her 
substantive visa application is considered, while he or she pursues merits or judicial 
review of a refusal or cancellation decision, or arranges his or her departure from 
Australia.
For example, there are two classes of Bridging Visa E (BVE), these being 
subclasses 050 and 051. A subclass 050 BVE may be applied for only by an unlawful 
non-citizen who has been “immigration cleared”27, which in effect means that 
the person originally entered Australia as the holder of a valid visa. It may be 
24 The term “migration zone” is defined by s.5(1) of the Act as follows:
“migration zone” means the area consisting of the States, the Territories, Australian resource 
installations and Australian sea installations and, to avoid doubt, includes: 
(a) land that is part of a State or Territory at mean low water; and 
(b) sea within the limits of both a State or a Territory and a port; and 
(c) piers, or similar structures, any part of which is connected to such land or to ground under such sea; 
but does not include sea within the limits of a State or Territory but not in a port.
This term is distinguished from the term “Australia”, which includes Australian territorial waters. A 
vessel can therefore be in “Australia” but not in the migration zone if it is in Australian territorial waters 
but outside a port.
25 See s.197AC of the Migration Act.
26 Note that s.198 empowers the Minister to remove a detainee who has a current action before a court, 
unless an injunction prevents such removal (see also s.153). However, it is Departmental policy not to 
remove such detainees until all court proceedings are complete.
27 This term is defined in ss.166 – 170 of the Migration Act.
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granted on a number of bases, including making acceptable arrangements to depart 
Australia28, an unresolved application for a substantive visa (including a Protection 
Visa)29, various kinds of applications for merits or judicial review of a refusal or 
cancellation decision30, or has sought the Minister’s humanitarian intervention in 
relation to a refusal or that the applicant has sought31. A BVE can also be granted 
to an unlawful non-citizen in prison32, as a means of ensuring that the State and 
Territorial correctional authorities have the duty of care in relation to the prisoner, 
not the Commonwealth.
However, compare this to the situation faced by an unauthorised arrival. A 
unlawful non-citizen who has not been immigration cleared may only make an 
application for a subclass 051 BVE. Such a visa may only be granted if the applicant 
meets one of the criteria specified in subregulations 2.20(7) – (11) of the Migration 
Regulations 1994. These criteria are that the applicant has made a valid application 
for a Protection Visa that has not been resolved, and in addition as follows.
Subregulation 2.20(7) – The applicant is a person who:
(c) who has not turned 18; and 
(d) in respect of whom a child welfare authority of a State or Territory has certified that release 
from detention is in the best interests of the non-citizen; and 
(e) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied that: 
(i) arrangements have been made between the non-citizen and an Australian citizen, 
Australian permanent resident or eligible New Zealand citizen for the care and welfare 
of the non-citizen; and 
ii) those arrangements are in the best interests of the non-citizen; and 
(iii) the grant of a visa to the non-citizen would not prejudice the rights and interests of 
any person who has, or may reasonably be expected to have, custody or guardianship of, 
or access to, the non-citizen.
Subregulation 2.20(8) – The applicant is over 75 years of age, and “the Minister is satisfied that 
adequate arrangements have been made for his or her support in the community”.
Subregulation 2.20(9) – The applicant “has a special need (based on health or previous experience 
of torture or trauma) in respect of which a medical specialist appointed by Immigration has 
certified that the non-citizen cannot properly be cared for in a detention environment” and “the 
Minister is satisfied that adequate arrangements have been made for his or her support in the 
community”. 
Subregulations 2.20(10) and (11) – The applicant is the spouse or de facto partner of an 
Australian citizen or permanent resident, the Minister is satisfied that the relationship is “genuine 
and continuing”, and the spouse or de facto partner nominates the applicant. Members of the 
family unit (such as dependent children) of such spouses or de facto partners are also covered.
Note that in each of these cases, the Minister must be satisfied of something, 
whether that is that there are suitable arrangements for the care of the applicant 
in the community, or that a relationship with an Australian citizen or permanent 
resident is a genuine one. Note also that for the purposes of subregulation 2.20(9) 
28 Subclause 050.212(2) of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994.
 29 Subclause 050.212(3) of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994. That is, an immigration detainee 
who was immigration cleared, becomes unlawful, and then makes a valid application for a Protection 
Visa in detention may be granted a BE subclass 050, regardless of the substantive merits of that 
application.
30 Subclauses 050.212(3A) – (5A) and 050.212(9) of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994.
31 Subclauses 050,.212(5AA) – (6B) of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994.
32 Subclause 050.212(7) of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994.
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the medical practitioner in question must be appointed by the Minister, and not a 
practitioner of the applicant’s choice. This gives the Minister great control over the 
grant of subclass 051 BVEs. 
Changes in the Wake of the Tampa
Significant changes to immigration detention laws came into effect in 2001, around 
the time of the Tampa crisis. The facts of this event are well-known and will not 
be discussed here33. However, in the wake of the incident, s.189 was amended34 to 
permit the discretionary unlawful non-citizens detected at sea, or who arrive in 
Australia at “excised offshore places”35, as to allow their removal to a “declared 
country” for processing of their claims (if any) for refugee status, in accordance with 
at first s.198A of the Act and then s.198AA36. This is the basis of the so-called Pacific 
Solution, which became well-known internationally. The Pacific Solution need not 
be discussed further in this paper, as there is no actual or planned equivalent in 
Canadian legislation, not the least because Canada lacks external territories that 
could be designated as “excised offshore places”. There is certainly no Canadian 
equivalent of Christmas Island, which is much closer to Indonesia than Australia.
Domestic Legal Challenges to the Australian Immigration Detention System
The Al Masri / Al Kateb Litigation
The Australian immigration detention system has survived a number of domestic 
legal challenges, the best-known being the Al Masri / Al Kateb litigation. In Minister 
for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v. Al Masri37, the applicant 
was a stateless Palestinian who had been refused a Protection Visa. He requested 
removal from Australia in accordance with s.198(1). However, no country could be 
found to which he could be removed, meaning that had to remain in immigration 
detention. Al Masri challenged his continuing detention, arguing that Lim had 
found that immigration detention was justified for the purpose of ensuring the 
availability of an unlawful non-citizen for removal. If removal was impossible, 
detention was unlawful.
Both the Federal Court38 and the Full Federal Court accepted these arguments. 
Black CJ, Sundberg and Weinberg JJ, writing a combined judgement in the Full 
Court, found as follows at paragraphs 120 and 121:
[120] In our view, the language of s 196, either taken alone or in the context of the scheme as a 
whole, does not suggest that the Parliament did turn its attention to the curtailment of the right 
to liberty in circumstances where detention may be for a period of potentially unlimited duration 
and possibly even permanent. On the contrary, the textual framework of the scheme suggests 
an assumption by the Parliament that the detention authorised by s 196 will necessarily come to 
33 For just one account of the Tampa incident, see Michael White, MV Tampa Incident and Australia’s 
Obligations – August 2001, 122 MaritiMe studies 7 (2002).
34 Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001. 
35 This term is defined in s.5(1) of the Act, and applies to a number of external territories of Australia, 
most notably Christmas Island.
36 Section 198A of the Act was inserted by the Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) 
(Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 (Cth). Section 198A was repealed and replaced by ss.198AA – 198AD 
by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Offshore Processing and Other Measures) Act 2011. 
37 [2003] FCAFC 70.
38 Al Masri v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1009.
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an end. Section 196 contemplates a “period of detention”, and that is how the section is headed. 
Whilst one purpose of the section is indisputably to authorise the detention of unlawful non-
citizens, another purpose is to specify the circumstances in which the period of detention is to 
come to an end. The latter purpose assumes that the detention will have an end. The assumption 
is that the detention of unlawful non-citizens will come to an end by the actual occurrence of one 
of three events: removal, deportation or the grant of a visa.
[121] The language of s 198(1) supports the conclusion that Parliament proceeded on an 
assumption that detention would, in fact, end rather than upon an understanding that detention 
might possibly be of unlimited duration … Indeed, as we have noted, the assumption made 
by members of the High Court about the scheme considered in Lim was that it had an element, 
the equivalent of the present s 198(1), that gave a person what was effectively a power to bring 
detention to an end39.
The Court therefore ordered Mr Al Masri’s release from detention. Somewhat 
ironically, he was successfully removed from Australia within a matter of weeks 
after the decision, which rendered the Minister’s application for special leave to 
appeal to the High Court moot. However, another stateless Palestinian, Mr Al-
Kateb, ended up in the High Court. Before the Full Federal Court decision in Al 
Masri, Mr Al-Kateb had been refused release from immigration detention by the 
Federal Court40, in which von Doussa J had found that the Federal Court’s decision 
in Al Masri41 was wrongly decided. Mr Al Kateb’s appeal was removed directly to 
the High Court.
The High Court42, in a 4-3 judgement, overturned Al Masri and found that laws 
that may have the effect of imposing indefinite detention on unlawful non-citizens 
were constitutionally valid. A key passage can be found in the judgement of Hayne 
J at paragraph 268:
It is essential to confront the contention that, because the time at which detention will end 
cannot be predicted, its indefinite duration (even, so it is said, for the life of the detainee) is or 
will become punitive. The answer to that is simple but must be made. If that is the result, it 
comes about because the non-citizen came to or remained in this country without permission. 
The removal of an unlawful non-citizen from Australia then depends upon the willingness of 
some other country to receive that person. If the unlawful non-citizen is stateless, as is Mr Al-
Kateb, there is no nation state which Australia may ask to receive its citizen. And if Australia is 
unwilling to extend refuge to those who have no country of nationality to which they may look 
both for protection and a home, the continued exclusion of such persons from the Australian 
community in accordance with the regime established by the Migration Act does not impinge 
upon the separation of powers required by the Constitution.
There was a split in the minority judgements. Gleeson CJ and Gummow J found 
that a law providing for indefinite immigration detention would be constitutionally 
valid, but that because s.196 did not expressly provide for this possibility, it had 
to be interpreted in such a way as to not permit it. Only Kirby J found that no 
legislation providing for indefinite immigration detention, no matter how clearly 
expressed, would be constitutionally invalid.
39 Referring to Lim, supra note 3, at paragraph 34 of the judgement of Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ.
40 SHFB v. Goodwin & Ors [2003] FCA 294. “Goodwin” is a typographical error – Mr Al Kateb brought 
an action against Philippa Godwin, the then Deputy Secretary of the Detention Services Division of the 
Department of Immigration.
41 Al Masri, supra note 38.
42 Al-Kateb v. Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562.
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Other Litigation
The High Court has, since Lim, considered a number of other cases in which the 
legality of immigration detention has been challenged. All have been unsuccessful. 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v. B43: The High 
Court overturned a decision of the Full Bench of the Family Court44, in which that 
court had found that s.67ZC of the Family Law Act 1975 allowed the Family Court to 
make any orders it wished for the benefit of children. Having made this finding, it 
ordered a number of children from one family released from immigration detention. 
The High Court found on appeal that s.67ZC could only be invoked in the case of a 
“matrimonial cause”, such as a divorce, and as no matrimonial cause existed in this 
case, s.67ZC did not apply and the Family Court had no jurisdiction.
Behrooz v. Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs45: Mr Behrooz, a detainee in the particularly infamous Woomera IDC, was 
charged with escaping from that IDC under s.197A of the Migration Act. He sought 
to defend the charge by arguing that the conditions inside the Woomera IDC were 
so poor as to be punitive, and not purely for the purpose of ensuring his availability 
for removal, and therefore not an exercise of the power to detain unlawful non-
citizens. The High Court disagreed, finding that he had been legally detained, and 
that his allegations of ill-treatment in detention could be resolved by an action in 
tort against the Commonwealth and the private contractors managing the centre on 
behalf of the government.
Re Woolley, ex parte M276/200346: Mr Woolley was the Manager of the Baxter 
IDC in South Australia. The applicants were a number of children detained in the 
centre, who argued that they could not be detained because they lacked the legal 
capacity to request removal from Australia under s.198(1), and the inherent parens 
patriae jurisdiction of the court should be regarded as a constitutional principle that 
invalidated s.189 as far as it applied to children, or alternatively gave the court the 
power to release children from detention regardless of s.189. The High Court found 
that a minor child can be released from detention if their parent(s) request removal, 
and that the parens patriae role of the court was not a constitutional principle, and 
could be overruled by statute. McHugh J summed up the decision at paragraph 
106 by stating that “[a]lthough it may be accepted that children who are unlawful 
non-citizens do not pose a flight risk and are not a danger to the community, the 
Parliament, acting constitutionally, is entitled to prevent any unlawful non-citizen, 
including a child, from entering the Australian community while that person 
continues to have that status”. The applicants were unsuccessful once again.
Cases before the United Nations Human Rights Committee
On the other hand, Australia’s immigration detention laws have been found by 
the UNHRC on no less than seven occasions to breach Articles 9(1) and 9(4). Given 
the conclusion in A v Australia47, this is hardly a surprising conclusion. The cases 
43 (2004) 219 CLR 365.
44 B v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 199 ALR 604.
45 (2004) 219 CLR 486.
46 (2004) 225 CLR 1.
47 A v. Australia, supra note 4.
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decided since A are C48, Baban49, Bakhtiyari50, D and E51, Shafiq52 and Shams53. The most 
recent UNHRC opinion, Shams, stated as follows at paragraphs 7.2 and 7.3:
7.2 As to the claim that the authors were arbitrarily detained, in terms of article 9, paragraph 1, 
the Committee recalls its jurisprudence that, in order to avoid a characterization of arbitrariness, 
detention should not continue beyond the period for which the State party can provide 
appropriate justification. In the present case, the authors’ detention as unlawful non-citizens 
continued, in mandatory terms, until they were granted visas … [T]he State party has not 
advanced grounds particular to the authors’ cases which would justify their continued detention 
for such prolonged periods. In particular, the State party has not demonstrated that, in the light 
of each authors’ particular circumstances, there were no less invasive means of achieving the 
same ends … For these reasons, the Committee concludes that the authors’ detention for a period 
of between three and over four years without any chance of substantive judicial review was 
arbitrary within the meaning of article 9, paragraph 1. 
7.3 As to the authors’ claims of a violation of article 9, paragraph 4, the Committee observes that 
the court review available to the authors was confined purely to a formal assessment of whether 
they were unlawful “non-citizen[s]” without an entry permit54. It observes that there was no 
discretion for a court to review their detention on any substantive grounds for its continued 
justification. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that any court review of the lawfulness of 
detention under article 9, paragraph 4, which must include the possibility of ordering release, is 
not limited to mere compliance of the detention with domestic law. While domestic legal systems 
may establish differing methods for ensuring court review of administrative detention, what is 
decisive for the purposes of article 9, paragraph 4, is that such review is, in its effect, real and 
not purely formal. By stipulating that the court must have the power to order release, “if the 
detention is not lawful”, article 9, paragraph 4, requires that the court be empowered to order 
release, if the detention is incompatible with the requirements in article 9, paragraph 1, or with 
any relevant provisions of the Covenant. In the authors’ cases, the Committee considers that the 
inability of the judiciary to challenge a detention that was, or had become, contrary to article 9, 
paragraph 1, constitutes a violation of article 9, paragraph 4. 
In other words, immigration detention will be “arbitrary” under Article 9(1) if it 
is not justified in the case of the particular individual detainee, and Article 9(4) will 
be breached if the courts are not empowered to order the release of a person whose 
detention is “arbitrary” within the meaning of Article 9(1). As previously noted, 
the word “arbitrary” also appears in s.9 of the Charter, and it will be necessary to 
consider whether the two terms will be interpreted the same way.
Despite these decisions, Australia still provides for mandatory detention of 
unlawful non-citizens in the migration zone, and despite some liberalisation of the 
Bridging Visa regime in recent times, there are no signs that the laws related to 
detention will be changed at any time soon. Much academic ink has been spilled on 
the subject of Australia’s mandatory detention laws, the overwhelming majority of 
it critical (some in almost hyperbolic terms), and there is really nothing more I could 
add to it here.
48 UN Doc CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999 (13 November 2002).
49 UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/1014/2001 (12 August 2003).
50 UN Doc CCPR/C/79/D/1069/2002 (29 October 2003). Members of this family were also the 
defendants in the High Court decision of MIMIA v. B (supra note 43).
51 UN Doc CCPR/C/87/D/1050/2002 (11 July 2006).
52 CCPR/C/88/D/1324/2004 (13 November 2006).
53 CCPR/C/90/D/1255 (11 September 2007).
54 This is an error in the opinion – the Migration Act has not provided for entry permits since the Migration 
Reform Act 1992 came into effect on 1 September 1994.
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CANADIAN LEGISLATION
Bill C-49
Bill C-49, which was formally titled “An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee Reform Act and the Marine Transportation Security 
Act”, and has been given the title of the Preventing Human Smugglers from Abusing 
Canada’s Immigration System Act in Parliament, was introduced into the House of 
Commons on 21 October 201055. That Bill lapsed with the 2011 Federal election, and 
how now been revived as Bill C-4.
Second Reading Speech
The Minister for Citizenship and Immigration, Jason Kenney, gave the second 
reading speech for Bill C-49 in the House of Commons on 27 October 2010. He 
summarised the purpose of the Bill as follows56:
Canadians are deeply concerned with a particularly pernicious crime, a crime that exploits 
vulnerable people in their dream to come to Canada, the dangerous crime of human smuggling.
In the past year, it is well known that Canada has received two large vessels on our west coast, 
together carrying nearly 600 illegal migrants to our shores, people who, based on our intelligence, 
had paid criminal smuggling syndicates some $50,000 each in order to come to Canada in the 
most dangerous and exploitative way possible.
The remarkable openness of Canada to immigration in general and refugee protection in 
particular, which makes possible our very generous approach to immigration, is dependent 
on public confidence in the system. I submit that Canadians demand an immigration system 
that is characterized by a sense of fair play and a rule of law. What disturbs them deeply about 
these mass illegal smuggling operations is precisely that they undermine those principles of 
fundamental fairness and the rule of law.
The position of Canadians and the position of this government is and ought to be that we will 
be a country of openness, we will be a country that provides protection to those who are in need 
of it and we will lead the world in the moral obligation of refugee protection, but we will not be 
treated like a doormat by criminal networks that seek to profit from, frankly, encouraging people 
to come to this country illegally in a fashion that puts them and others in mortal danger. We 
know that every year hundreds and potentially thousands of people around the world fall victim 
to the dangerous ruse of smuggling syndicates.
Note how the Minister appeals to a desire to stop organised crime, not 
specifically to preventing unauthorised arrivals to Canada. Possibly the most 
interesting comment came at page 1544 of the debate57:
Some would have us believe that we can successfully deter the smuggling operations simply by 
focusing on the smugglers. How I wish that were true. How I wish it were true that we did not 
have to, at the same time, address the demand side of the equation in the smuggling enterprise. 
However, to pretend that is the case, to pretend that we can avoid disincentivizing the customers 
of the syndicates from paying $50,000 to come to Canada is naive in the extreme.
55 http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Sites/LOP/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Language=E&Chamber=N&StartList=A
&EndList=Z&Session=23&Type=0&Scope=I&query=7122&List=stat
56 House of Commons Hansard, 27 October 2010, p.1539.
57 Ibid at p.1544.
Alan Freckelton/Frontiers of Legal Research, 1(1), 2013
73
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
This is a remarkably honest admission by a government that it will penalise 
some asylum-seekers to prevent illegal entry to a country, even if it does use the 
linguistic atrocity “disincentivizing”!
The Legislative Summary for Bill C-49 stated that the principal amendments to 
be made by the Bill were as follows58:
• Creates the new category of “designated foreign national” for members of a group which has 
been designated by the Minister as an “irregular arrival” to Canada with the resultant creation 
of a new detention regime; mandatory conditions on release from detention; restrictions on the 
issuance of refugee travel documents; and bars on certain immigration applications, applicable 
only to “designated foreign nationals”;
• Restricts the ability to appeal certain decisions to the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD), and adds 
to the powers of officers detaining persons upon entry to Canada for suspected criminality; 
• Amends the definition of what constitutes “human smuggling” under the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), introduces new mandatory minimum sentences for human 
smuggling, and adds new aggravating factors to be considered by the court when determining 
the penalties for the offences of “trafficking in persons” and “disembarking persons at sea”; and
• Amends the Marine Transportation Security Act (MTSA) to increase the penalties for individuals 
and corporations who contravene existing laws, and creates new penalties to be imposed 
specifically on vessels involved in contraventions of the MTSA.
Bill C-4
Bill C-49 lapsed with the Federal election called for 2 May 2011. The Bill was 
reintroduced to the Parliament on 21 June 2011, now titled Bill C-4. This Bill was 
introduced by the Minister of Public Safety, Mr Toews, who stated that “all of us 
have heard a great deal about the importance of the legislation before us today, 
which our government first introduced October 2, 2010, as part of an overall 
strategy to help put an end of human smuggling”59. Mr Toews also drew a direct 
link between the introduction of the Bill and the arrival of the MV Sun Sea when 
he stated that “[t]he arrival of two migrant vessels from Southeast Asia over the 
past two years, the MV Ocean Lady and the MV Sun Sea, have proved the reach and 
determination of organized human smuggling networks in their efforts to target 
Canada”60.
Mr Toews explained the impact of the Bill on unauthorised arrivals to Canada as 
follows61:
As part of the legislation, designated arrivals would face mandatory detention for up to one 
year to allow Canadian authorities to determine admissibility and illegal activity. In short, the 
detention period would provide more time to identify those who had arrived in our country and 
whether they posed a threat to our national security.
This mandatory detention of unauthorised arrivals to Canada is the key element 
to be discussed in this paper.
58 http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Sites/LOP/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Language=E&query=7122&Session=23&
List=ls 
59 House of Commons Hansard, 21 June 2011, p1729.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid at p1730.
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“Designated Foreign Nationals”
Item 4 of Bill C-49 introduces a new s.20.1 if the IRPA. Subsection 20.1(1) would 
provide as follows:
The Minister may, by order, having regard to the public interest, designate as an irregular arrival 
the arrival in Canada of a group of persons if he or she
(a)  is of the opinion that examinations of the persons in the group, particularly for the 
purpose of establishing identity or determining inadmissibility — and any investigations 
concerning persons in the group — cannot be conducted in a timely manner; or
(b)  has reasonable grounds to suspect that, in relation to the arrival in Canada of the group, 
there has been, or will be, a contravention of subsection 117(1) for profit, or for the benefit of, at 
the direction of or in association with a criminal organization or terrorist group.
A few features of this provision should be noted. Firstly, the Minister may 
designate a group of persons as an “irregular arrival” if that group falls within the 
provisions of s.20.1. That is, this is a discretionary power and not something that 
occurs by operation of law. Presumably the Minister will have to provide reasons 
for any designation.
A group can be designated as “irregular arrivals” if their identity cannot be 
readily established or they have been “smuggled” to Canada. The terms “criminal 
organisation” and “terrorist group” do not appear to be defined anywhere in the 
IRPA. However, they are defined in ss.467.1 and 83.01 respectively of the Canadian 
Criminal Code62, and this is no doubt the definition that would be applied. It might 
also be noted that no minimum number to a “group” is provided – would a single 
family be regarded as falling within the new s.20.1?
Consequences of Designation
The principal consequences of being designated as an “irregular arrival” are as 
follows. Firstly, an irregular arrival may not apply for permanent or temporary 
residence status, or any Canadian travel document, until five years after any claim 
for refugee or other protection is made – ss.20.1(2) and (3) respectively. While the 
irregular arrival will remain a protected person and therefore will not be removed 
from Canada (unless the fall within a ground of admissibility that applies to 
protected persons), this means that they will not be eligible for most government 
benefits, and will not be able to sponsor family members from overseas until that 
five year period expires. This also has the effect that they cannot leave and return to 
Canada during that period. 
Secondly, the new s.55(3.1) provides that designated foreign nationals must be 
detained. This is the first instance of mandatory immigration detention in Canadian 
history. The amended s.56 then adds that such a person must be detained until their 
claim for protection or refugee protection is approved, or they are released from 
detention by the Immigration Division.
Thirdly, the new s.57.1 provides that the Immigration Division must review the 
reasons for detention of a designated foreign national 12 months after they were 
first detained, and each six months thereafter. Compare this with the existing s.57, 
which provides that the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee 
Board must review the reasons for detention of the person within 48 hours of 
62 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46
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them being detained, and again within seven and then 30 days of detention. The 
grounds on which the Immigration Division may order the release of a person from 
immigration detention are set out in s.58, but they basically relate to Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada (CIC) or the Canada Border Security Agency (CBSA) 
being unable to substantiate their reasons for the decision to detain. Section 61 
permits the Immigration Division to impose conditions on release from detention. 
Section 57.1 would instead provide for mandatory detention for at least one year, 
although the Minister (not the Immigration Division) may nevertheless release a 
designated foreign national from immigration detention at any time, in “exceptional 
circumstances” – new s.58.1.
Clause 34(1) of Bill C-4 has the effect that declarations of “designated person” 
status can be made retrospectively for unauthorised arrivals to Canada on or after 
31 March 2009 – the date of the arrival of the Ocean Lady. However, clause 34(3) 
provides that the mandatory detention provisions of clause 57.1 do not apply to 
retrospectively designated persons.
The Legislative Summary provides the following useful table on detention 






Regime Applicable to 
Permanent Residents 
and Foreign Nationals 
(Section 57 of the 
IRPA)
Regime Applicable 
to Persons Detained 
Under the Authority of 
a Security Certificate 
(Section 82 of the IRPA)
Regime Applicable to 
“Designated Foreign 
Nationals” 
(New Section 57.1 of the 
IRPA Created by Bill C-4)
First review Within 48 hours of detention (section 57(1))
Within 48 hours of 
detention (section 82(1))
12 months after the day 





Within 7 days of 
the first review 
(section 57(2))
Within 6 months 
of the first review 
(section 82(2) or 82(3))
6 months after the day on 
which the first review was 




At least once during 
every 30-day period 
after the second review 
(section 57(2))
At least once during 
the 6-month period 
following the most 
recent review 
(section 82(2) or 82(3))
6 months after the day of the 
most recent review, and no 
sooner 
(new section 57.1(2))
It seems fairly clear that Bill C-49 takes two former Australian policies and 
introduces them to Canada. The prohibition on a designated foreign national’s 
status being regularised for a five-year period, with the result that they are ineligible 
to sponsor relatives and may not leave Canada during that period, is taken straight 
from the restrictions imposed on holders of Australian Temporary Protection Visas 
(TPVs)64. Secondly, the Minister’s power to “designate” certain non-citizens, with 
63 http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/LegislativeSummaries/bills_ls.asp?Language=E&ls=c4&P
arl=41&Ses=1&source=library_prb
64 Temporary Protection Visas were provided for by Part 785 of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 
1994, which was repealed with effect from 9 August 2008 by the Migration Amendment Regulations 2008 
(No 5) (Cth). Only holders of permanent protection visas or offshore humanitarian visas were eligible to 
sponsor family members overseas for the grant of humanitarian visas (such as subclasses 200, 201 or 202).
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the consequence of mandatory detention, is an almost exact copy of ss.54K, 54L and 
54N of the Migration Act 1958. 
The Australian precedent was noted by a number of MPs in the Canadian 
Parliament. To give one example, the MP for Vancouver Kingsway, Mr Davies, 
stated in Parliament as follows65:
I would like to focus on Australia’s example because it is instructive to the House. Australia 
had policies to lock up refugee claimants long-term and to deny them permanent status even 
when granted refugee status in an attempt to stop refugees coming to that country by boat. It is 
exactly what is happening here. The policies resulted in refugees, including many children, being 
traumatized by their experiences in detention.
The Australian Human Rights Commission, an organization created by the Australian 
parliament, conducted a national inquiry into children in immigration detention and found 
that children in Australian immigration detention centres had suffered numerous and repeated 
breaches of their human rights.
Far from deterring people, depriving refugees of the right to family reunification appears to 
have caused some people to arrive by boat, later bringing the wives and children of refugees in 
Australia who were unable to bring their families through legal channels66. This was a deeply 
divisive policy, with many people in Australia unclear as to what was the best approach. 
However, we do know that in the past three years Australia has moved away from its policies of 
detention and temporary status for refugees.
Mr Davies does not distinguish between the current detention provisions of 
the Australian Migration Act and its current provisions. On the other hand, the 
Minister of Immigration and Citizenship, Mr Kenney, was quite keen to point out 
the difference. He noted that Australia now requires detention of all unlawful non-
citizens, and pointed out that Canada’s laws, even with Bill C-4, are a good deal 
more restrained67:
Let me point out by way of comparison, because there is a lack of perspective in context here, that 
most of our peer democracies, most other liberal democracies, including those governed by social 
democratic parties such as the Labour [sic – Labor] government in Australia, have mandatory 
detention for all or almost all asylum claimants, not just illegally smuggled asylum claimants, but 
all or almost all asylum claimants.
That was the law adopted by the United Kingdom under the previous social democratic Labour 
government. That is the law in Australia under the social democratic Labour [sic] government.
I remember Prime Minister Gillard of Australia congratulating the NDP on its 50th anniversary. 
She actually defends a policy that puts under permanent detention all asylum claimants until 
their status is resolved. This is, by comparison, a radically more modest approach which only 
addresses illegally smuggled migrants for a limited period of time until they receive status, 
which under the new system would be three months.
65 House of Commons Hansard, 19 September 2011, at pp 1219-1220.
66 Mr Davies has a point here – TPVs came into effect in October 1999, by means of the Migration 
Amendment Regulations (no 12) 1999 (Cth), which inserted Part 785 of Schedule 2 of the Migration 
Regulations 1994. The number of unauthorised boat arrivals in 1999 was 3721. There was a slight fall to 
2939 in 2000, but then a large increase to 5516 in 2001. See PhilliPs & sPinks, supra note 7 at 22. It was the 
Pacific Solution, introduced in September 2001, which stopped the boats, not TPVs.
67 Ibid at 1399.
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The last sentence might be the key reason why the Canadian government has 
elected to adapt the “designated persons” provisions of the Australian Migration Act 
rather than the mandatory detention provisions of ss.189, 196 and 198. Adapting 
the less draconian laws gives the government a false appearance of moderation in 
its legislative program. I will argue at the end of this paper that even the designated 
persons provisions are most likely unconstitutional and unnecessary in Canada.
The reference to three months is a reference to the amendments made to the 
IRPA by the Balanced Refugee Reform Act68, which according to Mr Kenney would 
have the effect that “bona fide asylum claimants will receive a positive protection 
decision and therefore permanent residency within about three months of making 
their claim”. That is, Mr Kenney’s argument is that designated persons who are 
genuine refugees will be found to be so, and granted permanent residence, well 
before the 12-month period expires. 
Comment on Bill C-49
Certain non-government organisations have noticed the resemblance between the 
Australian legislation and Bill C-4 (or C-49), although again they have failed to 
notice that Bill C-4 closely mirrors earlier, superseded, legislation. The Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) has even included a photo of the Baxter 
Detention Centre in Port Augusta, South Australia in its website’s comment on the 
Bill69. The CCLA comments on Bill C-49 include the following70:
It is hard to understand what useful purpose is served by creating these hardships, and by 
prolonging the period of limbo, and making it more difficult for a person to whom Canada has 
granted refugee status to settle and integrate into their new home.
If the idea is to stop smugglers, this Bill does little to deter them, as most live and function far 
away from Canada’s borders. International cooperation and efforts may be far more effective.  If 
the idea is to attempt to deter people from using the services of “smugglers” (including paper 
forgers and ticket sellers, as described above), recent history in Australia demonstrates what 
common sense would dictate: people fleeing for their lives do not have the luxury of considering 
what will happen to them once they reach a safe haven. In Australia, which instituted similar 
policies, these were proven ineffective, and ultimately changed71.
Furthermore, in recognition of the desperate plight of refugees that leads them to obtain false 
papers, or to trust their fate to rusty boats, international law has long required that refugees not 
be made to suffer penalties for their illegal entry into a country.
In a similar vein, the Canadian Council for Refugees notes the following on its 
website72:
68 Bill C-11 of 2010. This Bill received Royal Assent on 29 June 2010 but is yet to come into effect.
69 http://ccla.org/our-work/focus-areas/bill-c-49/. (It might be noted that the Baxter IDC closed in 
August 2007 – see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baxter_Immigration_Reception_and_Processing_
Centre.)  
70 Ibid.
71 It is not clear which policies are being referred to here. The Pacific Solution, in its first incarnation in 
2001, was an extraordinarily successful policy, as unauthorised boat arrivals fell from 5516 in 2001 to 1 in 
2002 – see PhilliPs & sPinks, supra note 7 at 22. The morality of the policy may be another consideration.
72 http://ccrweb.ca/en/bill-c49-faq
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What is the purpose of Bill C-49?
The government has said the bill is about stopping smugglers bringing people illegally into 
Canada. But in fact the bill mostly contains changes that will punish not the smugglers, but 
instead the people they are smuggling, including refugees who need to get into Canada to save 
their lives.
How does Bill C-49 punish refugees?
Under Bill C-49, some refugee claimants, including refugee children, will be jailed for a year, 
without anybody reviewing whether they should be kept in detention or released. Also under 
Bill C-49, some refugees, even after they have been accepted as refugees by Canada, will be kept 
with a temporary status for 5 years. During these five years, they will not be able to bring their 
family (spouse and children) to Canada and they will not be able to travel outside Canada.
Which refugees are punished under Bill C-49?
Under Bill C-49, the Minister can “designate” a group as an irregular arrival. Clearly, the 
government would like to designate refugee claimants that arrive by boat, such as the Sri Lankan 
Tamils on the MV Sun Sea that arrived in British Columbia this summer. But the bill does not say 
that the refugee claimants must have arrived by boat in order to be designated. A group could be 
designated even if there was no smuggling involved. Once a group is designated, everyone in the 
group is punished.
A detailed comparison of the former Division 4B (and current Division 6 of Part 2) 
of the Migration Act and Bill C-4 can be found in the appendix. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BILL C-4
In my opinion, it is unlikely that Bill C-4, if enacted, would survive a constitutional 
challenge, unlike the Australian High Court’s decision in Lim. In particular, it is 
very likely that the new s.57.1 of the IRPA would be found to be in violation of both 
ss.7 and 9 of the Charter.
Charkaoui
In Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)73 the Supreme Court found 
that a number of provisions of the IRPA were invalid for inconsistency with the 
Charter. Principally at issue was s.77(1) of the IRPA, which permitted the Minister 
for Citizenship and Immigration and the Minister for Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness to sign a certificate declaring a non-citizen to be inadmissible. 
McLachlin CJ, writing for the court, described the statutory scheme as follows in 
paragraph 5 of the judgement:
The IRPA requires the ministers to sign a certificate declaring that a foreign national or permanent 
resident is inadmissible to enter or remain in Canada on grounds of security, among others: s. 77. 
A judge of the Federal Court then reviews the certificate to determine whether it is reasonable: 
s. 80. If the state so requests, the review is conducted in camera and ex parte. The person named 
in the certificate has no right to see the material on the basis of which the certificate was issued. 
Nonsensitive material may be disclosed; sensitive or confidential material must not be disclosed 
if the government objects. The named person and his or her lawyer cannot see undisclosed 
material, although the ministers and the reviewing judge may rely on it. At the end of the day, 
the judge must provide the person with a summary of the case against him or her — a summary 
that does not disclose material that might compromise national security. If the judge determines 
that the certificate is reasonable, there is no appeal and no way to have the decision judicially 
reviewed: s. 80(3).
73 Charkaoui, supra note 5.
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Mr Charkaoui was a Moroccan citizen and a Canadian permanent resident who 
was the subject of a s.77(1) certificate, issued on the basis that he was inadmissible 
for security reasons. He was then detained and proceedings to deport him began. 
Mr Charkaoui argued that s.77(1) of the IRPA conflicted with s.7 of the Charter and 
was therefore invalid, or alternatively that he had been denied procedural fairness 
in the decision to detain and deport him. He also argued that provisions of the IRPA 
that dealt with detention of inadmissible non-citizens were constitutionally invalid.
The Supreme Court found that the action for habeas corpus was protected by 
s.7 of the Constitution. McLachlin CJ noted that Mr Charkaoui had been granted 
a hearing at the review of the certificate before a judge, but went on to find as 
follows74:
Questions arise, however, on the other requirements, namely: that the judge be independent 
and impartial; that the judge make a judicial decision based on the facts and the law; and finally, 
that the named person be afforded an opportunity to meet the case put against him or her by 
being informed of that case and being allowed to question or counter it. I conclude that the IRPA 
scheme meets the first requirement of independence and impartiality, but fails to satisfy the 
second and third requirements, which are interrelated here.
The Supreme Court accepted that “fundamental justice” does not always 
require that a person be informed of every detail of the case against him or 
her. For example, the Court cited Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration)75, which found that s.7 of the Charter did not require a potential 
deportee to be informed of the details of police investigations or the names of 
informers. A “summary” of the case against him was sufficient. However, the Court 
found in this case that the consequences for Mr Charkaoui – possible detention and 
deportation – were serious, and that this required a high standard of fundamental 
justice be afforded to him. McLachlin CJ noted that “it is one thing to deprive a 
person of full information where fingerprinting is at stake, and quite another to 
deny him or her information where the consequences are removal from the country 
or indefinite detention”76. The real crux of the judgement, however, is probably at 
paragraphs 63-64, which notes that the applicant in a s.77 proceeding would never 
know even the substance of the case against them, and that the judge, bound by the 
requirement that he or she not release certain information to the applicant, is left in 
a situation of “asking questions and ultimately deciding the issues on the basis of 
incomplete and potentially unreliable information”77. McLachlin CJ summed up as 
follows78:
The judge is therefore not in a position to compensate for the lack of informed scrutiny, challenge 
and counter-evidence that a person familiar with the case could bring. Such scrutiny is the whole 
point of the principle that a person whose liberty is in jeopardy must know the case to meet. Here 
that principle has not merely been limited; it has been effectively gutted. How can one meet a 
case one does not know?
74 Ibid at paragraph 31.
75 [1992] 1 SCR 711.
76 Charkaoui, supra note 5 at paragraph 60.
77 Ibid at paragraph 63.
78 Ibid at paragraph 64.
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The Court therefore found that s.77(1) of the IRPA was inconsistent with s.7 of 
the Charter and therefore invalid. The fact that the applicant could be deported 
from Canada on the basis that of information that was unknown to him or her 
meant that “fundamental justice” was not provided.
In relation to immigration detention, the Court did not find that immigration 
detention, even when potentially indefinite in duration, conflicted with ss.9 and 
10 of the Charter. The Court found that detention pursuant to a s.77 certificate 
was not arbitrary, because it was “triggered” by the signing of the certificate, and 
that “the security ground is based on the danger posed by the named person, and 
therefore provides a rational foundation for the detention”79 – a finding that could 
support the Constitutional validity of new s.55(3.1), as set out in Bill C-4.  The fact 
the detention was regularly reviewed under Division 6 Part 1 of the IRPA was also 
important80. However, a provision that prevented review of the detention until 
120 days had elapsed did breach ss.9 and 10(c) of the Charter and was therefore 
invalid. McLachlin CJ conceded that “[i]t is clear that there may be a need for some 
flexibility regarding the period for which a suspected terrorist may be detained”81, 
but added as follows82:
93. However, this cannot justify the complete denial of a timely detention review. Permanent 
residents who pose a danger to national security are also meant to be removed expeditiously. If 
this objective can be pursued while providing permanent residents with a mandatory detention 
review within 48 hours, then how can a denial of review for foreign nationals for 120 days after 
the certificate is confirmed be considered a minimal impairment? 
94. I conclude that the lack of timely review of the detention of foreign nationals violates s. 9 and s. 
10(c) and cannot be saved by s. 1.
Given this decision, it is hard to see how the new s.57.1 could, if enacted, survive 
a Constitutional challenge. Note in particular the lack of any s.1 analysis of s.77 – 
McLachlin CJ seemed to regard the lack of “proportionality” in s.77 as obvious and 
did not think it necessary to undertake a detailed Oakes analysis of the provision83. 
While in any Charter challenge to Bill C-4 the government will undoubtedly have 
s.1 arguments ready, it seems that they would likely be given short shrift by the 
Supreme Court.
While Mr Kenney points out that many “designated persons” would have their 
application for refugee status dealt with well before the 12-month review period 
specified by s.57.1(1) arises, this does not seem to be the point. Indeed, McLachlin CJ 
pointed out in Charkaoui that the Minister “assert[ed] that when the provisions were 
drafted, it was thought that the removal process would be so fast that there would 
be no need for review”84, but that “[t]his is more an admission of the excessiveness 
of the 120-day period than a justification”85. The fact is that McLachlin CJ in 
Charkaoui regarded a prohibition on reviewing the applicant’s detention for 120 
79 Ibid at paragraph 89.
80 Ibid at paragraph 110.
81 Ibid at paragraph 93.
82 Ibid at paragraphs 93-4.
83 R v. Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103.
84 Charkaoui, supra note 5 at paragraph 92.
85 Ibid.
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days as a breach of s.9 of the Charter that could not be saved by s.1. When you also 
take into account the fact that serious allegations had been leveled at Mr Charkaoui, 
and no such allegations will usually be made in the case of an unauthorised boat 
arrival seeking refugee status in Canada, the 12-month prohibition on reviewing 
detention seems even more unjustified.
Finally on this point, the Canadian Bar Association cited the severity of the 
12-month review prohibition in its submission to a Parliamentary Committee, 
arguing that Bill C-49 (as it then was) would be unconstitutional86.
The Bill C-49 mandatory detention is not based on any rational assessment of danger to 
the public, flight risk or necessary period of investigation of identity or inadmissibility. It 
appears to be imposed as a punishment for accessing Canada’s inland refugee determination 
process through smuggler arranged arrivals. The denial of detention review for 12 months is 
unprecedented in immigration law, even in security certificate cases.
Arbitrariness
It is notable that both s.9 of the Charter and Article 9 of the ICCPR prohibit 
“arbitrary” detention. What does this term mean?
There is surprisingly little jurisprudence in Canada on this matter. In Charkaoui, 
McLachlin CJ, rejecting the proposition that detention of an inadmissible non-
citizen was arbitrary in and of itself87, stated as follows88:
I would reject Mr. Almrei’s argument that automatic detention of foreign nationals is arbitrary 
because it is effected without regard to the personal circumstances of the detainee. Detention is 
not arbitrary where there are “standards that are rationally related to the purpose of the power 
of detention”: P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (loose-leaf ed.), vol. 2, at p. 46-5. The 
triggering event for the detention of a foreign national is the signing of a certificate stating that 
the foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international 
rights, serious criminality or organized criminality. The security ground is based on the danger 
posed by the named person, and therefore provides a rational foundation for the detention.
That is, detention is not “arbitrary” if it is both lawful and based on some “rational 
foundation”. Mr Charkaoui’s initial detention had some rational foundation because 
of the seriousness of the allegations involved, but the prohibition on reviewing his 
detention for 120 days did not. This reasoning appears to elaborate somewhat on 
the Supreme Court’s previous leading decision on s.9 of the Charter, R v. Latimer, 
in which Lamer CJC, on behalf of the majority, stated that “Mr. Latimer’s arrest 
was entirely lawful, and failing an attack against the legislative provision which 
authorized the arrest, I do not see how a lawful arrest can contravene s. 9 of the 
Charter for being arbitrary”89. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal also considered the relationship between legality 
and arbitrariness in R v. Duguay90. That case concerned the arrest of the applicant 
on suspicion of break-and-enter offences. The trial judge had found that the police 
86 canadian Bar association, Bill c-49, Preventing huMan sMugglers froM aBusing canada’s iMMigration 
systeM act (Nov. 2010) available at http://www.cba.org/cba/submissions/pdf/10-78-eng.pdf at 6.
87 The UNHRC cases have taken the same approach – see for example A v. Australia, supra note 4, at 
paragraph 9.3.
88 Charkaoui, supra note 5 at paragraph 89.
89 [1997] 1 SCR 217 at 232.
90 (1985) 18 CCC (3d) 289.
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had arrested the applicant and two co-accused as a “means of conducting their 
investigation”91, and not on the basis of probable cause. The trial judge found the 
arrest to be both unlawful and a breach of s.9 of the Charter.  MacKinnon ACJO 
commented on the interpretation of s.9 as follows92:
It cannot be that every unlawful arrest necessarily falls within the words “arbitrarily detained”. 
The grounds upon which an arrest was made may fall “just short” of constituting reasonable 
and probable cause. The person making the arrest may honestly, though mistakenly, believe that 
reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest exist and there may be some basis for that belief. 
In those circumstances the arrest, though subsequently found to be unlawful, could not be said 
to be capricious or arbitrary. On the other hand, the entire absence of reasonable and probable 
grounds for the arrest could support an inference that no reasonable person could have genuinely 
believed that such grounds existed. In such cases, the conclusion would be that the person 
arrested was arbitrarily detained. Between these two ends of the spectrum, shading from white 
to grey to black, the issue of whether an accused was arbitrarily detained will depend, basically, 
on two considerations: first, the particular facts of the case, and secondly, the view taken by the 
court with respect to the extent of the departure from the standard of reasonable and probable 
grounds and the honesty of the belief and basis for the belief in the existence of reasonable and 
probable grounds on the part of the person making the arrest.
In other words, it appears that the Ontario Court of Appeal has decided that 
detention will be arbitrary if there is no objective justification for it. Detention 
may be illegal without being arbitrary if those responsible for the detention had a 
reasonable, even if incorrect, belief that the detention was lawful.
James Stribopoulos, in an article published shortly after the Charkaoui decision 
was handed down, has noted the following aspects of the Duguay reasoning93:
A conclusion that each [the terms “unlawful” and “arbitrary”] is synonymous would have 
far-reaching implications beyond unjustified detentions and arrests. For instance, if it were 
established that a police officer arrested in circumstances where he or she was obligated not to 
under the Criminal Code or failed to release someone following an arrest as the Code required the 
resulting unlawful detention would be characterized as arbitrary and unconstitutional. Similarly, 
a failure on the part of police to bring an accused before a justice within 24 hours of an arrest 
would necessarily be unconstitutional – regardless of any good explanation for the delay.
Stribopoulos goes on to note94 that the courts seem to “fear being required to 
characterize as ‘arbitrary’ – and unconstitutional – unlawful detentions resulting 
from ‘a technical error of process’”95. In other words, there is no clear indication 
from Canadian courts that s.9 of the Charter is to be interpreted in the same way 
that the UNHRC interpreted Article 9(1) of the ICCPR in A v. Australia96 and later 
cases, that is, that detention is arbitrary unless it is both lawful and justifiable on an 
individual basis. 
91 Ibid at 296.
92 Ibid.
93 James Stribopoulos, The Forgotten Right: Section 9 of the Charter, Its Purpose and Meaning, (2008) 40 
Supreme Court L.R. 211 at 232.
94 Ibid.
95 R v. Simpson (1994) 88 CCC (3d) 377 at 388 (Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal). This 
decision is basically in accord with Duguay, supra note 91.  
96 Supra note 4.
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If the Duguay analysis is applied to Bill C-4, and in particular new s.57.1, what 
is the result? It would be difficult to argue that a CIC officer who detained a person 
who had been designated under the new s.20.1(1) could not have a reasonable 
belief, at the time, that the detention of the designated person was lawful – unless 
we are to impute a knowledge of international law to CIC decision-makers. A court 
would have to find that:
1. The officer knew or suspected that mandatory detention of designated persons 
contravened Article 9(1) of the ICCPR; and
2. The officer knew or suspected that a breach of Article 9(1) would mean that 
detention under s.57.1 would be unconstitutional and unlawful.
I would argue that it would be excessive to dispute this much knowledge to 
a CIC decision-maker97, and that detention under s.57.1 could not be found to 
contravene s.9 of the Charter on this basis. Instead, the Charkaoui argument would 
have to be used – very likely successfully, as I have already argued – to strike 
down s.57.1. The Charkaoui route would be a preferable approach anyway, because 
it would invalidate s.57.1 rather than attacking each and every administrative 
decision made under it.
Is Bill C-4 Even Necessary?
Many Australian lawyers would be stunned to think that Bill C-4 is even necessary. 
Canada has had two (admittedly large) boatloads of unauthorised arrivals in the 
life of the current government, totaling 56898 people. Compare those figures to the 
numbers of arrivals in Australia since 200999:
Year Number of Boats Crew Passengers
2009 60 141 2726
2010 134 345 6555
2011 69 168 4565
2012 278 392 17202
From an Australian point of view, one wonders why Canada is so fixated on 
a miniscule number of unauthorised boat arrivals that the government intends to 
introduce legislation that, especially given the Charkaoui decision, is almost certain 
to be found in breach of the Charter. Nothing in the numbers of unauthorised 
arrivals statistics for Canada could justify such a move.
97 This situation is vaguely similar to the Australian High Court decision in Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 221 
ALR 32. This case turned on the interpretation of s.189(1) of the Migration Act 1958, which relevantly 
provides that “[if] an officer knows or reasonably believes a person … to be an unlawful non-citizen, 
the officer must detain that person”. Mr Taylor was a permanent resident of Australia whose visa was 
cancelled in 2001 after he was convicted of a number of sexual offences against children. He was then 
detained in the Villawood Immigration Detention Centre in Sydney. Taylor successfully challenged the 
cancellation, on grounds that are immaterial here, in an earlier High Court case, Re Patterson ex parte 
Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391. The successful challenge meant that Taylor’s visa was taken never to have 
been cancelled, and he was never an unlawful non-citizen. He then sued the Commonwealth for false 
imprisonment. The High Court unanimously found that the officers who detained Taylor could not have 
had anything other than a reasonable belief that he was an unlawful non-citizen, as there was no way 
they could have known that he would successfully challenge the cancellation of his visa.
98 House of Commons Hansard, Tuesday 20 September 2011, at 1029.
99 PhilliPs & sPinks, supra note 7, at 22. 
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CONCLUSION
In summary, the mandatory detention provisions of Bill C-4, which borrow heavily 
from Division 6 of Part 2 of the Australian Migration Act 1958 (formerly Division 
4B of Part 2) would be unlikely to survive a constitutional challenge. In particular, 
s.57.1, if enacted, would very likely be struck down under s.9 of the Charter. The 
Bill almost certainly also represents a breach of Articles 9(1) and 9(4) of the ICCPR, 
particularly given that the UNHRC has found that the Australian precedent was in 
breach of these articles. All in all, it is difficult to see why unlawful boat arrivals to 
Canada, who are vanishingly few in number compared to Australia, cannot simply 
be dealt with by the processes that currently exist in the IRPA for detaining, and 
reviewing the detention of, non-citizens unlawfully present in Canada.
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APPENDIX -- COMPARISON OF DETENTION PROVISIONS OF 
FORMER DIVISION 4B OF THE MIGRATION ACT AND BILL C-4
Migration Act Bill C-4 Comments
Section 54K – Definitions
“designated person” means a 
non-citizen who: 
(a) has been on a boat in the 
territorial sea of Australia after 
19 November 1989 and before 1 
December 1992; and 
(b) has not presented a visa; and 
(c) is in Australia; and 
(d) has not been granted an entry 
permit; and 
(e) is a person to whom the 
Department has given a 
designation by: 
(i) determining and recording 
which boat he or she was on; and 
(ii) giving him or her an identifier 
that is not the same as an 
identifier given to another non-
citizen who was on that boat; 
and includes a non-citizen born 
in Australia whose mother is a 
designated person
Clause 5 – new s.20.1(1)
The Minister may, by order, 
having regard to the public 
interest, designate as an
irregular arrival the arrival in 
Canada of a group of persons if 
he or she
(a) is of the opinion that 
examinations of the persons in 
the group, particularly for the 
purpose of establishing identity 
or determining inadmissibility 
— and any investigations 
concerning persons in the 
group — cannot be conducted 
in a timely manner; or
(b) has reasonable grounds to 
suspect that, in relation to the 
arrival in Canada of the group, 
there has been, or will be, a 
contra-vention of subsection 
117(1) for profit, or for the 
benefit of, at the direction of or 
in association with a criminal 
organization or terrorist group.
The new s.20.1(1) would be 
more restrictive than the 
former s.54K in Australia. 
Under s.54K, the mere fact 
of unauthorised arrival 
in Australia by boat was 
sufficient for a designation 
to be made. Under 
s.20.1(1), the Minister 
must be satisfied that the 
unauthorised arrivals 
cannot be identified in 
a timely fashion, or that 
an offence under s.117(1) 
appears to have been 
committed (“people 
smuggling), and that 
the offence has been 
committed for profit, or by 
a “criminal organisation or 
terrorist group”. However, 
s.20.1(1) is not restricted to 
unauthorised boat arrivals 
– unauthorised air arrivals 
are covered if they arrive 
as a “group”. 
Clause 5 – New s.20.1(2)
(2) When a designation is made 
under subsection (1), a foreign 
national — other than a foreign 
national referred to in section 
19 — who is part of the group 
whose arrival is the subject 
of the designation becomes a 
designated foreign national 
unless, on arrival, they hold 
the visa or other document 
required under the regulations 
and, on examination, the officer 
is satisfied that they are not 
inadmissible.
There is no direct 
equivalent to this provision 
in the Migration Act, but the 
new s.20.1(2) would make 
it clear that a designation 
applies to each and every 
individual in a designated 
group.
Subsection 54L(1) – Mandatory 
Detention
(1) Subject to subsection (2), after 
commencement, a designated 
person must be kept in custody. 
Subsection 54N(1) – Detention 
after initial entry
If a designated person is not in 
custody immediately after 
commencement, an officer may, 
without warrant: 
(a) detain the person; and 
(b) take reasonable action to 
ensure that the person is kept 
in custody for the purposes of 
section 54L.
Subclause 9(2) – New s.55(3.1)
If a designation is made under 
subsection 20.1(1), an officer 
must:
(a) detain, on their entry into 
Canada, a foreign national 
who, as a result of the
designation, is a designated 
foreign national; or
(b) arrest and detain without a 
warrant a foreign national who, 
after their entry into Canada, 
becomes a designated foreign 
national as a result of the 
designation, or issue a warrant 
for their arrest and detention.
These are the key 
mandatory detention 
provisions of the respective 
legislation. Note the lack 
of discretion on the part 
of any decision-maker 
in detaining designated 
persons on arrival, 
although s.54N(1) of the 
Migration Act appears to 
provide for discretionary 
detention of unauthorised 
arrivals who become 
“designated persons” after 
their entry to Australia.
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Migration Act Bill C-4 Comments
Subsections 54L(2) and (3) – Release 
from Detention
(2) A designated person is to be 
released from custody if, and only if, 
he or she is: 
(a) removed from Australia under 
section 54P; or 
(b) given an entry permit under 
section 34 or 115. 
(3) This section is subject to section 
54Q.
Clause 11 – new s.56(1)
Despite subsection (1), a 
designated foreign national 
who is detained under this
Division must be detained 
until
(a) a final determination is 
made to allow their claim 
for refugee protection or 
applic-ation for protection;
(b) they are released as a 
result of the Immigration 
Division ordering their 
release under section 58; or
(c) they are released as 
a result of the Minister 
ordering their release under 
section 58.1.
The Canadian provision is 
again slightly wider than 
the Australian provision. 
Under Bill C-4, designated 
persons can be ordered 
to be released by the 
Immigration Division or 
by the Minister. Under 
Division 4B, designated 
persons could be released 
only if they are expelled 
from Australia or granted 
an entry permit.
Removal from Australia – ss.54P(1) – 
(3)
54P.(1) An officer must remove a 
designated person from Australia as 
soon as practicable if the designated 
person asks the Minister, in writing, 
to be removed. 
(2) An officer must remove a 
designated person from Australia as 
soon as practicable if: 
(a) the person has been in Australia 
for at least 2 months or, if a longer 
period is prescribed, at least that 
prescribed period; and 
(b) there has not been an entry 
application for the person. 
(3) An officer must remove a 
designated person from Australia as 
soon as practicable if: 
(a) there has been an entry application 
for the person; and 
(b) the application has been refused; 
and 
(c) all appeals against, or reviews 
of, the refusal (if any) have been 
finalised.
Bill C-4 does not amend 
existing provisions with 
respect to removal or 
deportation from Canada.
Subsection 54P(1) was 
very important to the High 
Court in Lim, because it 
meant that the detainee 
could in fact bring their 
detention to an end at 
any time, if they were 
prepared to return to their 
home country100. 
100 Lim, supra note 3, at paragraphs 33 and 34 of the judgement of Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ.
To be continued
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Migration Act Bill C-4 Comments
Time Limits on Detention – ss.54Q(1) 
– (3)
(1) Sections 54L and 54P cease to 
apply to a designated person who 
was in Australia on 27 April 1992 if 
the person has been in application 
custody after commencement for 
a continuous period of, or periods 
whose sum is, 273 days. 
(2) Sections 54L and 54P cease to 
apply to a designated person who 
was not in 
Australia on 27 April 1992, if: 
(a) there has been an entry application 
for the person; and 
(b) the person has been in application 
custody, after the making of the 
application, for a continuous period 
of, or periods whose sum is, 273 
days. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, a 
person is in application custody if: 
(a) the person is in custody; and 
(b) an entry application for the person 
is being dealt with; 
unless one of the following is 
happening: 
(c) the Department is waiting for 
information relating to the application 
to be given by a person who is not 
under the control of the Department; 
(d) the dealing with the application is 
at a stage whose duration is under the 
control of the person or of an adviser 
or representative of the person; 
(e) court or tribunal proceedings 
relating to the application have been 
begun and not finalised; 
(f) continued dealing with the 
application is otherwise beyond the 
control of the Department
Time Limits on Review by 
the Immigration Division – 
Clause 12, new s.57.1
(1) Despite subsections 57(1) 
and (2),
in the case of a designated 
foreign national who is in 
detention, the Immigration 
Division must review the 
reasons for their continued 
detention on the expiry of 
12 months after the day on 
which that person is taken 
into detention and may not 
do so before the expiry of 
that period.
(2) Despite subsection 57(2), 
in the case of a
designated foreign national 
who is in detention, the 
Immigration Division must 
review again the reasons for 
their continued detention 
on the expiry of six months 
after the day on which 
the previous review was 
conducted — under this 
subsection or subsection (1) 
— and may not do so before 
the expiry of that period.
(3) In a review under 
subsection (1) or (2),
the officer must bring the 
designated foreign
national before the 
Immigration Division or to 
a place specified by it.
These provisions are 
markedly different, 
because Australia lacks 
any authority that can 
review and order the 
release of a detainee. 
Instead, s.54Q purported 
to place a legislative time 
limit on the duration 
of the detention of a 
designated person. 
However, because the 273-
day “clock” was “stopped” 
whenever the Department 
or the designated person 
sought information from 
an external source, or 
the designated person 
commenced court 
proceedings, it was 
frequently impossible 
to determine whether 
a person’s maximum 
period of detention had 
ended. Because of the 
unworkability of s.54Q, 
Australia has never 
reintroduced a maximum 
period of detention.
The Canadian legislation 
is much simpler, and 
amends the power of the 
Immigration Division 
to review a person’s 
detention. The detention 
of a designated person 
cannot be reviewed until 
they have been detained 
for one year, and each six 
months thereafter. 
Discretion to release from 
Detention – subclause 
13(2), new s.58.1
The Minister may, on 
request of a designated 
foreign national, order their 
release from detention if, 
in the Minister’s opinion, 
exceptional circumstances 
exist that warrant the 
release. The Minister may 
impose any conditions, 
including the payment of a 
deposit or the posting of a 
guarantee for compliance 
with the conditions, that he 
or she considers necessary.
There is no direct 
equivalent to the new 
s58.1 in the Migration Act. 
Provisions relating to the 
grant of a Bridging Visa 
E101, and “community 
detention” in the 
form of a “residence 
determination”102 may 
cover some of the same 
ground, but there is no 
discretionary power in 
the Act to simply release a 
designated person or other 
unlawful non-citizen from 
detention.
101 Item 1305 of Schedule 1 and Part 051 of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994.
102 Part 2, Division 7, Subdivision B of the Migration Act 1958. A “residence determination” is defined by 
the Act as a form of detention, but is effectively a form of release from detention on the condition that the 
non-citizen resides in a specified location.
